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INTEGRATION, DECENTRALISATION AND 





In the light of a number of recent African experiences, and in 
particular those of the Special Rural Development Programme in Kenya, this 
paper looks at the issues of integration, decentralisation and implementation 
in rural development programming. 
The issue of integration is found to have economic content where 
there is complementarity among projects such that an integrated package of 
projects is more productive than the sum of each of the projects taken 
individually. Where the programme does not encompass the entire country, 
and especially where explicitly welfare and human resource development 
projects are part of the integrated package, the concentration of govern-
ment activities in programme areas can lead to major inequities in the 
inter-regional distribution of resources. Finally, while integrating 
various government and external interventions is important, of far greater 
importance is the integration of such activities with the activities and 
capacities of local-level producers and communities. 
Decentralisation is seen as the cure to the ills of inadequate 
localised knowledge in designing programmes, isolation of such programmes 
from local productive activities and capacities, and a lack of participation 
by local people. Decentralisation, however, does not necessarily cure these 
ills. Real power may not be devolved from the bureaucracy and the calibre 
of local-level bureaucrats may mean that the quality of planning suffers. 
The character of local participation depends on local power relations and 
the interests of the poorest strata are unlikely to be adequately represented, 
so that local inequities may be worsened, While local people are the 
repository of great expertise concerning their areas, which should be the 
basis for the development programme, they do not necessarily have all the 
appropriate information, nor the necessary institutional base, for designing 
optimal plans for their areas. Detailed knowledge of the local physical and 
institutional environment and the participation of local people in the 
development of their areas require that real decision-making must be 
decentralised, but the problems involved must be recognised and resolved 
in the process. 
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Implementation systems for integrated rural development 
programmes need explicit attention in their design if they are to counter-
act the tendency for any development programme to grind to a halt. Four 
administrative innovations are briefly described and evaluated. They are: 
1. The local development committee, 
2. The area coordinator with explicit responsibility for the 
whole programme, regardless of the agency involved, 
3. The direct grant to be allocated at the local level, 
4. The use of simply designed management and monitoring systems 
to identify bottlenecks and delays and resolve problems. 
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The jobs and incomes of the vast majority of the population in 
countries such as Kenya are rural. Even with a high rate of growth of non-
rural employment (Kenya is one of those countries where in fact formal 
wage employment has been growing sporadically, if at all), the current low 
proportion of the total labour force in such wage employment and the 
current high rate of growth of the total population ensures that the 
absolute number of rural people will be expanding inexorably for the 
foreseeable future. It is unthinkable that this vast and growing rural 
population should not significantly contribute to economic growth, or that 
the benefits of growth should pass them by. 
Just as the problems of employment and migration or the problems 
of welfare and income distribution cannot be solved without significant 
and sustained progress in the rural areas, neither can the problems of 
preserving a balance of international payments nor, indeed, of sustaining 
industrial growth. The exports and foreign exchange earnings of most 
African countries emanate overwhelmingly from their agricultural sectors, 
and a number of the most important industries have substantial linkages 
with the rural producer and consumer. The development of other sectors, 
and the economy as a whole, will be severely constrained and even thwarted 
without sustained growth and development of the rural and agricultural 
sector. 
Perhaps the most severe long-term economic problem, and one that 
is placing extreme pressure on rural production systems, is that of 
burgeoning population growth- There is now considerable consensus on the 
evidence that it is particularly hard to reduce birth rates despite 
growing pressures on limited resources, without widespread participation 
in the processes of economic and social development and widely perceived 
improvements in standards of living. Again, it is crucial that these 
changes reach the vast mass of rural people. 
The paradox is that despite broad recognition of the importance 
of rural and agricultural development and numerous policy statements 
according it the highest priority, country after country is facing severe 
problems in raising farm productivity and incomes. It is not just Kenya 
that has difficulty accelerating and maintaining the pace of rural 
development. Seemingly intractable problems in these areas virtually 
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characterise the developing countries of the Third World, Bringing develop-
ment projects to the stage of successful implementation in the rural 
sector appears to be uniquely difficult: ministries of agriculture seem 
chronically incapable of productively spending the money allocated to them; 
there are constant problems with creating and sustaining a local adminis-
trative structure that is functional and that relates specific programmes 
and investments to locally diagnosed constraints and development capacity; 
and severe distributional problems arise such that government efforts are 
open to the criticism that they not only fail to reach those who need 
them most but that the consequence of these efforts is frequently to 
worsen inequities by subsidising the better off at the expense of the poor. 
All these problems are easy to recognise but their recognition does not 
imply a ready solution. Solutions on paper and in the abstract, further-
more, lack credibility until they have been carried to the point of trial 
and implementation on the ground-
This logic has led to a great deal of experimentation with rural 
development programming in Africa over the last few years. Some of these 
programmes have been deliberately experimental, complete with well-
conceived efforts to learn from the results, some have been motivated 
principally by ideological considerations in an effort to mould rural 
societies into a pre-ordained or desired image, and some have merely been 
part of a desperate effort to "do something". For a number of these 
projects there have been specific crop or livestock project objectives; 
for others the objectives have been multiple, involving a wide range of 
both income-earning and welfare goals, 
More attention has been given lately to the experience of rural 
development programmes which have already been carried out in Africa. 
Uma Lele's book, The Design of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa 
(10), presents an interesting and extremely useful selection of the most 
significant rural development programmes from a number of African countries. 
The book also undertakes a well-conceived analysis of the lessons to be 
drawn from these efforts, 
In Kenya, the Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP) has been 
the government's principal experimental effort in rural development 
programming over the last years, A detailed evaluation of SRDP has recently 
been completed by the Institute for Development Studies. (8) 
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This short paper will not attempt to summarise either Uma Lele's 
work or the SRDP Evaluation. It does seem worthwhile however, drawing for 
the most part on the Kenyan experience, to focus on a number of problems 
and issues that appear to be of general importance in determining whether 
rural and agricultural development programmes succeed. Of particular 
interest will be those programmes that affect smallholders rather than 
large-scale estates or plantations. This is not because the latter are 
insignificant in terms of agricultural output, but they present a series 
of different problems, only marginally related to the development of the 
existing systems in which the vast majority of African agriculturalists 
produce, consume and live. The distribution of the benefits and enhanced 
incomes that result from rural development is now recognised as requiring 
explicit treatment in planning. Those with the lowest incomes need overt 
recognition as target groups for efforts to raise productivity and welfare. 
Three principal issues will be discussed in this paper: the 
first is the issue of integration and project complementarity; the second 
is that of local diagnosis and decentralised planning; and the third is the 
issue of implementation and the way in which problems and bottlenecks are 
identified. The SRDP, from which most of the case material in this paper 
is drawn, illustrates these three issues in operational terms. It rep-
resents a serious Kenyan attempt at comprehensive and integrated planning 
and programming in the six widely varying administrative divisions chosen 
as SRDP areas. It has as one of its principal features attempted to decen-
tralise the diagnostic and planning process to the local level. As another 
principal experimental component, it has attempted to develop implementation 
systems to counteract the apparent tendency for rural projects to grind 
to a halt, not for reasons of policy or intent but because of unintended 
administrative blockages and breakdowns, 
INTEGRATION AND PROJECT CQMELEME-MTARTEY 
The concept of integration clearly requires some definition. It 
emanates from the complementarities that are inherent in the rural develop-
ment process. It involves a recognition that the productivity of particular 
investments can be enormously enhanced if they are undertaken in an 
appropriate relationship with complementary investments. 
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At the technical level an obvious example is dairy development 
programming. (See Hopcraft et al„, 7, and the SRDP Evaluation, 8, chapter 
9«) Genetic improvements in cattle can have a negative impact on farm 
incomes unless they are accompanied by adequate disease control measures 
to protect the more productive, but frequently more susceptible animals G 
The same can be true for other cattle management practices. Improved 
livestock on an unimproved feeding regimen may be less productive than 
unimproved livestock which are at least tolerant of poor conditions. An 
integrated dairy development programme would thus include genetic 
improvements, disease control and measures to improve management and 
feeding practices, as well as attention to the marketing and pricing 
structures for dairy products. In Western Kenya, measures to introduce 
improved breeds of dairy cattle without adequate disease control or manage-
ment improvement have certainly worsened the lot of a good many farmers. 
Where loans were involved for the purchase of improved diary cows that 
subsequently died, the result has been farmer indebtedness without the 
income base to repay the debt. 
Fundamentally, the question is one of an adequate definition of 
a "project". In the above case, one aspect of the necessary programme to 
raise dairy productivity, without the complementary aspects, does not 
embody an adequate definition. In a situation where cattle are dying of 
disease a disease control project is likely to be justified, but the pay-
off for such a project depends on the productivity of the cattle saved 
from disease. Integration requires that the whole spectrum of possible 
constraints on the sector be considered, and a package of projects, any one 
of which may not be justified on its own, may be more than justified when 
considered together. 
When it comes to the introduction of a new crop, again the 
genetic materials, the plant nutrients and the weed or pest control are 
technical complements: the absence of any one may drastically reduce pro-
ductivity. Farmer knowledge levels, transporting and marketing facilities, 
and a number of other possible constraints on the particular crop project 
dictate that the project must integrate a programme that ensures that an 
ignored constraint does not become binding. 
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To carry the logic a step further, the justification for a road 
construction project must be sought in the traffic it will carry, the 
transport cost savings that are attributable to the road and the stimu-
lating effects of reduced transport costs on the economy. A road may be 
well constructed and have considerable traffic-bearing capacity, but its 
payoff ex post depends not on the road itself, but on other economic 
activities that have transport implications. A road project may be more 
than justified if it is related to a whole package of other investments 
and developments in a particular area; it may be totally unjustified 
without them. It is a case where interrelated investments and institutional 
developments, both farm and non-farm, are likely to be justifiable in 
economic terms while any of the individual measures in isolation is not. 
Integration among investments in directly productive activities (e.g. crops 
and livestock) and physical and institutional infrastructure (e.g. roads, 
marketing systems, disease control and farmer educative services) raises 
the productivity of each individual investment to the point where each is 
justified. 
The question is: where does one stop in justifying the inclusion 
of additional projects in an integrated rural development programme? 
The logic developed so far is completely consistent with normal criteria 
used in the social analysis of investments. The benefits attributable 
to the marginal project may in large measure result from increasing the 
productivity of other projects, but as long as the costs are at least 
justified by these benefits the project should be included. The crucial 
step is that of identifying the inter-relationships between projects so 
that the additional benefits that accrue as a result of the interactions 
are considered in deciding on the package. This logic for integrating 
a series of projects is straightforward (though incredibly widely violated). 
It indicates, for instance, that in a dairy development package of improved 
cows, improved farmer knowledge, disease control and dairy marketing 
facilities, very high returns, indicating a misallocation of resources, are 
available from investment in one of these areas if that area has been 
relatively ignored. While the logic is clear, it does not imply that 
the task is easy. Projects have different time horizons and, particularly 
when human resource development projects are included, different welfare 
implications. 
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Even more difficult issues are raised when additional projects 
which have little or no complementarity with the other projects in the 
local package are also considered in an "integrated" programme. Inevitably, 
the thorny issue of the interregional distribution of resources and 
incomes is raised. While it would be possible to make a case that rural 
industries, for instance, have supply and demand linkages with other 
rural producers and consumers and should therefore go where other rural 
developments are also underway, the inevitable consequence is increasing 
disparities among regions. Real growth/equity tradeoffs thus exist. In 
the case of welfare-oriented projects such as those concerned with 
nutrition and health, they should presumably be allocated to where the 
need is greatest rather than to where other programmes are being carried 
out. (While improved nutrition and better health can undoubtedly increase 
the productivity of labour on, for example, labour-intensive public works 
projects, they can also have this effect for a farmer working on his own 
farm, and it is not clear why the former should be more important than the 
latter. ) This is not to say that projects oriented specifically toward 
welfare goals are not legitimate parts of a rural development effort. 
Bruce Johnston and Anthony Meyer have argued cogently that a composite 
package of health, nutrition and family planning does belong in an inte-
grated rural development programme. (9) Partly this is because such a 
package tends to improve the welfare of the very poorest, who are frequently 
excluded from the benefits of programmes purely aimed at raising productivity. 
Another reason is that measures to reduce birth rates are perhaps the most 
important of all in any serious effort to increase incomes and welfare, 
and such measures tend to be far more effective in the context of a 
"composite package". 
The distributional issue must be faced squarely if, as is almost 
inevitably the case at this stage, the integrated rural development pro-
gramme does not encompass the whole country. It has obvious implications 
for equity and welfare in that income-earning opportunities created by 
the programme are inevitably concentrated in the areas selected. This 
concentration is compounded by locating both infrastractural and welfare 
programmes and investments in the same areas. 
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This inter-regional distributional question became a political 
issue in SRDP. It was hard to convince those from outside the SRDP areas 
that the integrated development programme was purely experimental and 
that the experiment required that the development and welfare programmes 
exclude their areas. From an allocative, as well as an equity point of 
view, it is possible for returns to particular investments to be driven 
down by overconcentration on particular areas. There were certainly cases 
where non-SRDP areas were starved for funds while the opposite problem, 
that of how to use up allocated money by a budgetary deadline, was plagu-
ing SRDP areas. With the more comprehensive district development 
planning initiatives of the Kenya Government that are taking up where 
SRDP left off, these inter-regional issues must be given explicit treatment. 
The allocative issue of where economic resources have the highest 
payoff at the margin and the distributional issue of how the benefits are 
distributed among individuals and among regions require a national, rather 
than a local perspective,"'" The danger of having a development programme 
defined in local rather than national terms, especially where the agency 
responsible has separate funding and substantial power at the centre but 
is exclusively interested in the success of its own programme, is that 
both distributional and allocative issues are ignored beyond the boundaries 
of the programme's geographical domain. This was certainly the case 
(deliberately so for experimental reasons) in the SRDP areas. Provincial 
staff were supposed to treat SRDP areas on a par -with all other areas in 
their provinces with regard to ongoing programmes and were discouraged from 
a natural tendency to concentrate non-SRDP resources in other than SRDP 
areas as a form of compensation. Ultimately, the constraint on generalising 
the integrated approach of the SRDP to the country as a whole is budgetary. 
The general allocation issue must be viewed in the light of overall 
resource constraints, productive opportunities and welfare needs. Local 
planning of the SRDP type then merges with national planning. 
1. In theory these two issues merge with a clearly defined social 
welfare function, but it is precisely the lack of a clear definition 
of the tradeoffs involved (growth versus equity, higher incomes now versus 
higher incomes later, improved incomes and welfare in one region versus 
improved incomes and welfare in another) that creates the problem. 
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Perhaps the extreme case of concentrating expenditures in a 
particular area of integrated rural development is the Lilongwe Land 
Development Programme in Malawi. Uma Lele asks:-
Why should the people of Lilongwe benefit from substantial 
productive services, intensive land use planning, roads, soil 
conservation measures, water supply, and health clinics, while 
several other regions of Malawi do not receive even the minimum 
level of agricultural services? (10) 
There is little doubt that even by the most conventional productivity 
criteria (i.e., excluding equity considerations) resources could have 
been better used in a less concentrated investment pattern. If so, the 
pursuit of integration has led to both lower growth and a less equitable 
distribution than would otherwise have been possible. 
Perhaps the principal fallacy with regard to integrated rural 
development programming is that the main issue is one of integrating a 
number of different government interventions with each other, rather than 
integrating all government or external intervention with what is and will 
be going on among the farmers and rural communities themselves. 
Coordination between different arms and ministries of government is clearly 
a good thing in defining packages of investment projects, but governments 
tend towards the illusion that the most important activities in the 
rural areas are their own. When it comes to building a road, for instance, 
government planners think more readily of locating it in relationship 
to some government project, even a relatively insignificant one in terms 
of traffic and transport cost savings, rather than of locating it where 
some indigenous local productive activity is developing or could develop, 
even in the absence of government activity. Integration of this latter 
sort requires not merely coordination of government programmes, it 
requires local diagnosis and analysis of the contraints and the potential 
of a particular local area and the tailoring of local programmes in such 
a way that existing institutions and productive systems are complemented 
and enhanced. 
LOCAL DIAGNOSIS AND DECENTRALISATION 
In this section the logic and the need for decentralisation will 
be examined. The major problems and conflicts that have emerged in 
practice, particularly the problems of developing good local diagnostic 
and planning ability and of devolving real decision-making power to the 
local level, will then be raised. 
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In view of the elemental fact that farming depends on the 
physical, human and technological capacity that exists at the local level, 
the extent to which local potential and local constraints are ignored 
in rural development programming is constantly astounding. Few industries 
are as dependent as agriculture on the physical and ecological environment. 
It should be unnecessary to stress that physical feasibility in terms of 
soils, terrain, water and the general climatic pattern cannot be generalised 
from one specific location to another. Ignoring or not having enough 
local detail about the physical and biological environment is a certain 
prescription for disaster. 
A related aspect of determining production possibilities in a 
given area, and one that is often ignored at enormous cost by physical 
scientists, is what might be called the institutional environment. This 
includes the nature and structure of the farming systems in an area, farm 
sizes, tenure patterns and access to land and other resources; it includes 
such factors as level of commercialisation, farmers' attitudes and knowl-
edge levels; it also includes questions of the existence and level of 
government and commercial off-farm services such as research,^ ..ex't;e©si©»Ti-^  
disease control and financial institutions. With the exception of certain 
physical or climatic features, knowledge of the characteristics of an 
area do not necessarily imply that they are immutable. Soil fertility 
can be enhanced; farmers' knowledge and skill levels and even culturally 
embedded attitudes can undergo major changes; road systems and marketing 
structures can be developed. But the fact that these characteristics can 
be altered does not mean that they can be ignored. The whole process of 
rural development is, to a considerable extent, the process of introducing 
feasible changes in the physical, biological and institutional environment. 
But this is a process that requires a detailed local knowledge of the 
existing situation and of the potential of the area. 
Another dairy cattle project in the Western part of Kenya will 
serve as an illustration. The area has undoubted ecological potential 
for dairy production and there is a good market for milk both locally 
and in a nearby large town. A government farm was thus established to 
act as a demonstration unit and as a source of high-grade dairy cows. 
This farm is run by government employees on the lines of a large commercial 
farm, except that it is not required to, nor does it, cover its costs. 
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It is stocked with a potentially very productive, imported breed of dairy 
cow, a breed that requires intensive and highly skilled management in terms 
of both feeding and disease control. Local Ministry of Agriculture 
staff make efforts to promote sales of cows (at high, but still heavily 
subsidised, prices) to farmers in the area. 
The principal problems are two-fold. First, the farmers in the 
area have had little or no experience with the management of high-grade 
exotic stock. The second problem is that disease, and particularly 
tick-borne disease to which the imported cows are particularly susceptible, 
has not been brought under control in the area. The result is that at 
the time of this writer's visit to the area, 80 per cent of the cows that 
had been sold to local smallholders had died, frequently within a few 
weeks of having been purchased by the farmer. The financial and the psycho-
logical setback to the new owners resulting from these deaths has been 
considerable. Since they were purchased at subsidised prices, the cost 
to the economy of the livestock losses was even greater than the 
private costs. The efforts to create "model dairy farms" in the area to 
counteract these losses has involved channelling excessive funds to a few 
farmers (inevitably those who are already better off), with minimal impact 
beyond the boundaries of the chosen farms. 
Still in the livestock area, a group ranch was established in 
North-west Kenya. The "feasibility study" for this project showed no 
Understanding of either the ecological or the social constraints on the 
development of the production system. Stocking rates and offtake rates 
were taken from some textbook guideline with no reference to the social 
preferences or management practices of the leoal pastoralists. Government 
programmes of water supply and disease control were then introduced which, 
under the circumstances, could only lead to a worsening of the chronic 
overstocking with domestic livestock. This pattern is already destroying 
the grass cover, leading to massive soil erosion, and undermining the 
environmental base for maintaining animal life and human welfare in the 
area. It is a case of a government programme leading to desert creation. 
In both of these cases the physical, biological and social 
constraints at the local level were not adequately considered or analysed. 
The questions must now be raised as to whether this lack of local infor-
mation and analysis is a result of inadequate decentralisation and whether 
- l i - IDS/DP 252 
greater decentralisation of the planning process would improve the 
situation? 
Two interrelated aspects of decentralisation emerge in practice 
as problems. The first is the question of the devolution of real decision-
making and expenditure power to the local level. The second is the 
adequacy of the institutional base at the local level to which power can 
Be devolved, To restate, first of all does Government really want to 
decentralise, does it want the political and allocative implications of 
local participation? Secondly, is local participation going to improve 
or worsen the performance of rural planning and of project selection, 
design and implementation? The inter-relatedness of these two questions 
is obvious. Even if a genuine political commitment exists to decentralise 
power and enlist local participation, harsh questions must be asked 
about the allocative implications of doing so. Of particular importance 
here is the relative priority given to directly productive, income-earning 
projects, longer-term infrastructural investment projects, and projects 
and expenditure designed for more immediate welfare and consumption goals. 
Decentralisation does not necessarily involve increasing the 
participation of local people nor increasing the equity with which 
resources are distributed. A process of decentralising a bureaucracy 
does not necessarily shift power from that bureaucracy - perhaps the 
reverse. In the Tanzania case there is little doubt that, at least in 
the early stages of the decentralisation effort, the process involved 
more rigourous imposition of central government notions on local people 
than the opposite. In other cases, decentralisation devolves power to 
local elites who use it to further their own political or financial goals 
at the expense of more broadly conceived income or welfare goals in the 
area. 
The point being made is not merely a populist one (though the 
mistrust or inhibition of popular participation is frequently inappropriate) 
it is that real conflicts may develop between the needs and priorities of 
an area as conceived by a "rational planner" on the one hand and by local 
people on the other. Pastoralists on heavily overgrazed land are a case 
in point. To meet their pressing demand for milk they conceive of 
their needs as being for more livestock, They therefore want more water 
points and disease control measures to enable them to expand domestic 
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livestock numbers. The preservation of their livelihood on the other 
hand requires managing the range resources and maintaining an adequate 
grass cover on the land. Where overgrazing is the problem, this involves 
the drastic reduction or even removal of domestic stock. Destocking 
measures however, given current institutional arrangements and incentive 
patterns, are not likely to be part of a programme initiated by local 
people in these areas. 
In general, local people may not have the necessary technical 
and economic information to know the productivity and welfare tradeoffs 
that confront them. Also local institutions may be such that individuals 
do not have the incentive to behave in a fashion that is consistent with, 
let alone maximises, the social interest. With a common property resource 
such as communally held land, for instance, the group's interest is one of 
husbanding the land to maintain or enhance its productivity in future 
years, whereas the individual's interest is to overtax the land for grazing 
in the present period because he himself may not be the beneficiary of its 
future productivity. 
The enormous pressure that tends to be exerted at the local 
level to expand education, especially formal education, is a case of 
inaccurate or outdated economic information being used to generate invest-
ment programmes. Despite the fact that the economic returns to formal 
schooling have been driven down by the expansion of the school system, 
parents tend to view schooling, especially subsidised schooling, as the 
best investment they can make. The result is that where allocative 
decisions really reflect local preferences, schools tend to be expanded 
to the point where the economic returns to the marginal investment are 
extremely low and even negative. (See Hopcraft, 5 and 6.) 
None of the above implies that centrally initiated or bureau-
cratically controlled planning systems are immune to the allegation of 
misallocation, from either the productive or the distributive point of 
view. To return to a major theme of this paper, government officers tend 
to view development in terms of government schemes, frequently conceived 
in isolation from local political processes or local production systems. 
Government activity that complements local capacities and mobilises latent 
local energies is likely to yield far greater returns. Such integration 
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between the activities of government and the activities of local 
producers and local communities is undoubtedly more likely where there 
is genuine local participation in the planning process, 
The case of labour-intensive road construction in one of the 
SRDP areas will illustrate. (See SRDP report, chapter 12.) Initially the 
planning and siting of the roads were undertaken by a government engineer 
using topographical and engineering criteria and with little or no 
reference to the local polity. The technical task was above reproach, 
but there were severe difficulties with local participation. The local 
assumption was that the roads were yet another government activity whose 
progress was, at best, to be watched with mild interest and, at worst, 
to be treated as an external imposition. 
Following something of a political crisis relating to the roads 
programme, the initial scheme was scrapped and planning proceeded'through 
a process that involved real participation at the locational and sub-
locational level. Siting and right-of-away issues were left to local 
people and the enthusiasm that was generated for the roads enabled the 
planners not only to acquire right of way, but to enlist voluntary labour 
for the initial land clearing. When it came to enlisting workers for the 
construction of the road, a wage of Kshs 5.00 (US $0.55) per day was 
offered for casual labourers. The only recruitment problem faced was that 
of too many applicants and lottery systems had to be developed to determine 
2 
which of the applicants were to be given the work. The final siting of 
the roads was not very different from that originally proposed by the 
government engineer, but the implications of the process for both the 
participation and mobilisation of local people were substantially different. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
This paper has discussed some of the problems of the content of 
rural development programmes and some of the mechanisms by which choices 
are made. It is now increasingly recognised that some of the most severe 
2. The Institute for Development Studies recommended that this 
wage be reduced, firstly so that those workers with the lowest opportunity 
cost in agricultural and other pursuits would take the work; secondly, so 
that the wage bill would be distributed more equitably; and thirdly, to 
maximise the amount of road constructed from a given budget. This recommen-
dation was not followed, and wages were in fact raised to substantially 
above local agricultural wage levels. 
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inadequacies of rural projects and development programmes pertain to the 
delivery system and its capacity to sustain momentum, resolve problems, 
and keep planned activities and expenditures on track. 
If implementation is a problem for single ministries or agencies, 
it is more so when multi-sectoral, multi-agency, integrated programmes are 
involved. Operational responsibilities tend to be allocated strictly down 
agency lines and there are seldom local-level personnel with adequate power 
outside their own agency who are concerned with the operation of the programme. 
An experimental development administration system was devised 
as part of the SRDP, designed to tackle some of the problems of implementation 
as well as the issues of integration and decentralisation. The system was 
described and evaluated in some detail elsewhere. (See David, 4, Chambers, 
3, and Chapter 19 of the SRDP report, 8.) Martin David lists a number of 
administrative innovations that have been significant in improving the rural 
development delivery system. Four such innovations will be referred to here: 
1) the project committee, 2) the area coordinator, 3) direct grants, and 4) 
the role of management and monitoring systems. 
The project committee consists of the functionaries of each of the 
central government operating agencies in the area and a variety of local 
political and administrative representatives, Some of these representatives 
were chosen through an electoral process (which, depending on the nature of 
the local political system, may or may not make them good spokesmen for 
local felt needs), and some derive their legitimacy from other sources (e.g. 
chiefs and traditional leaders). The committees' functions include 
coordinating the programmes of different government agencies, relating these 
programmes to local needs and potentials, providing the main channel for 
local participation in the allocative process, and monitoring the imple-
mentation of planned projects. 
The performance of project committees has been highly variable. 
In some areas they have been run entirely by government personnel with 
minimal local participation. Efforts to co-opt local leaders without 
giving them decision-making power have generally not been successful, but 
questions about the political legitimacy of these leaders and about the 
wisdom of the allocative or management decisions that they make have rein-
forced the reluctance of government bureaucrats to have real power slip 
from their hands. In other areas there has undoubtedly been genuine popular 
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participation in decision making, reflecting real local debate. Where 
this has happened, it has not only led to a better integration of the 
government programme with indigenous farm and community activities, but 
it has also resulted in improved local information about government 
activities, more willing mobilisation for self-help projects, and improved 
participation by local producers and others in government initiated schemes. 
The position of SRDP Area Coordinator (AC) was established in 
response to the need to have an effective executive at the local level 
with responsibilities for the whole integrated programme, regardless of 
the agency involved. The AC is the model for the District Development 
Officer in the Kenya Government's District Development Planning initiative. 
He convenes the Project Committee, supplies members with necessary infor-
mation, and is responsible for the planning, the coordination and the 
implementation of the integrated programme. His appointment is with the 
Ministry of Finance and Planning but his responsibilities involve the 
complete range of operating ministries (agriculture, works, commerce and 
industry, health, education, etc.). He not only deals with the local staff 
of these ministries, but, as the need arises, with the central offices as 
well. A system of "link-men" exists at the headquarters of each of the 
operating ministries to form the AC's primary contacts. These link-men are 
senior officers whose principal task is to solve problems when they arise 
and to overcome unnecessary bureaucratic impediments. When the ACs posted 
to local areas have been of adequate competence, when they have been given 
sufficient bureaucratic support, and when they have been allowed to remain 
in their areas long enough to develop real expertise, they have made a 
very major contribution to the effectiveness of integrated programmes. 
The degree to which these conditions are fulfilled is, in fact, a good 
indication of the seriousness with which government is undertaking the 
rural development task. 
The use of direct grants to be administered by the Area Coordi-
nator on behalf of the local development committee has proved extremely 
useful in breaking bottlenecks created by funding procedures along strictly 
ministerial lines. The use of matching grants in a number of different 
projects has also been particularly useful in mobilising local resources 
and local enthusiasm. These frequently take the form of local labour 
being contributed while the materials and the design skills are paid for 
from outside. 
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The experience with management and monitoring systems has been 
somewhat variable. (See SRDP report, 8, and Belshaw and Chambers5l and 2.) 
Such systems require a thorough understanding by the staff involved and 
must be kept up-to-date if they are to be useful. It is therefore 
essential that they be uncomplicated and not overly time-consuming. It 
is also essential that they be a functioning part of a determined and 
continuous effort to break bottlenecks and resolve problems that arise, 
rather than becoming an end in themselves. 
Two such systems have been developed and tested in the SRDP areas. 
The first is the Project Implementation and Management System (PIM), a 
series of reports and bar charts that provide to both local staff and 
central ministries a regular systematic review of the programme and an 
early warning of impending or actual bottlenecks. 
In some areas PIM is regarded as the most significant of the SRDP 
innovations; it is at the very centre of the management operation and has 
undoubtedly made an enormous difference to the success rate in implement-
ing an integrated series of projects. It is fundamentally a tool in the 
hands of the Area Coordinator and its value depends on his insistence on 
maintaining it and the use he makes of it. In other areas the system is 
not kept up-to-date and has degenerated to an additional bureaucratic task 
added to the pile of "pending" paper-work. 
The Field Staff Management System (FSMS) is the second management 
tool which has been developed as part of the SRDP, It involves procedures 
for training extension agents, involving them in programmingt monitoring 
their activities, and evaluating the results. The experience with FSMS 
is similar to that with PIM. It can degenerate to an overlay of additional 
bureaucratic activities as an end in itself, or it can become the centre 
of an extension service with markedly improved management and performance. 
The simplicity of the system and the ease with which it can be kept 
functional are clearly crucial to its performance, but above all it should 
only be introduced when there is a clear commitment to its use and clear 
understanding of its rationale and the procedures involved. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The twin imperatives of raising the productivity of the African 
economies and improving the welfare of the poorest people both imply that 
the performance of rural development programming must be radically improved. 
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A great deal of experimentation has gone on in this area and important 
insights have been gained. This paper has looked at three principal 
issues in the light of recent experience, particularly the experience 
of the Special Rural Development Programme in Kenya. 
The first is that of integration. Some investments are 
technical complements and must be undertaken in an integrated fashion. 
The social returns to complementary projects undertaken jointly can be a 
great deal higher than when those projects are undertaken in isolation. 
Improved livestock without improved disease control has, for example, 
increased cattle mortality in some areas, undermining the returns to 
investments aimed at the genetic improvement of the livestock. This 
logic can be stretched to justify a range of different projects being 
introduced into a given area to take advantage of a new road, for instance, 
which will in turn be justified by the other simultaneous investments. 
The problem of inter-regional allocation arises when the logic 
of "integration" is used to concentrate resources in particular regions 
to the exclusion of others. Distributional issues especially arise when 
specifically welfare oriented projects or human resource development 
projects are located where integrated programmes are being undertaken, 
rather than being distributed on the basis of need. In the extreme, the 
pursuit of integration leads to both lower growth and less equitable 
income distribution than is possible with an alternative allocation of 
resources. 
The major fallacy with regard to integration is that the main 
task is one of integrating or coordinating the government programme. In 
fact the main task is that of integrating any government or external 
intervention with what is going on among farmers and rural communities 
themselves. 
The second principal issue is that of decentralisation. Rural 
development planning that is undertaken without detailed knowledge of the 
« 
t local physical, social and institutional environment, without reference 
to local capacities, constraints and experience, and without the partici-
pation of local people creates problems to which decentralisation would 
appear to be the answer. Decentralisation does not, however, necessarily 
resolve these problems. It may not shift power from the government bureau-
cracy, and, where it does, the groups to which power is devolved may not 
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be representative, especially of the poorer strata of society. Local 
people, furthermore, may not have the information, incentives or local 
political structures necessary for well conceived local planning and 
investment decision making. 
Government schemes are frequently conceived in isolation 
from local political processes and local production systems. Government 
activity that complements local capacities and mobilises latent local 
energies tends to yield far higher returns. Such integration between the 
activities of government and the activities of local producers and local 
communities is a great deal more likely where there is real local 
participation in the planning process. 
The third issue is particularly crucial given the lags, delays 
and bottlenecks that seem to plague rural development programmes; it is 
that of implementation. This can be a particular problem where several 
ministries or agencies are involved in an integrated programme. Four 
administrative innovations are described as having been particularly useful 
in this regard. 
The first is the development or project committee which is a 
forum for a variety of government officers and local leaders to meet, 
elicit views and make decisions. The second is the Area Coordinator, 
a government officer whose responsibilities involve the whole integrated 
programme, its planning and implementation. The third is the direct grant 
that puts some expenditure power in the hands of local planning authorities 
This can be used to break bottlenecks that can otherwise cause major delays. 
The fourth ma the use of management and monitoring systems that systematically 
set goals and targets and identify the places where delays are occurring 
and problems are arising. It is necessary that such systems be kept simple 
and that they be tied into a determined and continued effort to resolve 
problems that arise. 
There is now little doubt that neither the economic growth 
objectives nor the human welfare objectives of countries such as Kenya can 
be attained without drastic improvements in rural development. These 
improvements will only come by trial and frequently by error. It is 
extremely important that the process be accompanied by well-conceived 
analysis so that we learn from both our failures and our suceesses. 
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